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Risk-based Capital Standards for Banks:
A Critique
N. Arua*
There is a consensus on the need to impose minimum capital requirements on banks.
However, there exists far less agreement about how this minimum amount of capital should
be calculated. This paper presents a critique of the form of the risk-based capital standards
known as Basel I & II. The substance of basing capital adequacy requirements on risk
sensitivity remains unquestionable. Absolute rules on banks' minimum paid-up capital or
shareholders' funds are considered useful only to the extent that they serve as complementary
or temporary measure to address the potential uncertainties in the accuracy of risk exposure.
It examines the likely implications of the Basel II Capital Accord for the Nigerian banking
system and advises that the CBN should consider carefully the cost implication of the new
Accord before developing timetable for its implementation.
Key Words: Banks minimum capital requirement, Credit risk, Market risk, Operational risk,
Basel I & II capital accords, Risk weighted assets, Benchmark risk weights.
JEL Classification Numbers: G 21

I.

Introduction

R

isk-based capital standards require banks to hold capital in relation to
their risk exposure. In the recent past, bank regulators specified
minimum capital standards for banks that were independent of their
underlying risks. In 1986, the United States Federal Banking Agencies
proposed adoption of a risk-based capital measure that would take explicit
account of broad differences in risk in a banking organization's assets and offbalance sheet items. The risk-based capital proposed was aimed at fostering
co-ordination among supervisory authorities in the U.S. In 1987, a new riskbased capital rules were proposed based on a joint US/UK agreement. The
scope of the international effort was expanded further when the Basel
* Arua is a lecturer in the Department of Banking and Finance, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki. He is
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Committee on Banking Supervision modified and extended the US/UK
agreement to set internationally consistent capital standards for the G10
countries plus Luxembourg. The report of the Committee titled “International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standard” also called the
“Basel Accord I” or “BIS I” was presented in July 1988. While the Accord was
initially applied to internationally-active banks in the 12 industrial countries, it
quickly became acknowledged as a model for capital regulation of the banking
system in both developed and developing economies. It is believed to have
been adopted in some form by more than 100 countries, including Nigeria.
The basic aim of the regulation is to require that banks maintain sufficient
capital to absorb unforeseen losses. Broad agreement exists about the need to
impose minimum capital requirement in order to maintain the stability of the
financial system, however, there exists far less agreement about how this
minimum amount of capital should be calculated. As a result, the original riskbased capital standards have been subject to heavy criticisms by academics,
practitioners and regulators.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has responded severally to
these criticisms by proposing alternative capital rules. After extensive
consultations with bank supervisory authorities worldwide, the final document
of this proposal known as the New Capital Accord was presented and endorsed
by Central Bank Governors and Heads of Banking Supervision of the G10
countries in June 2004, with an amendment in November 2005. The document
was circulated to bank supervisory authorities' worldwide with view to
encouraging them to adopt the New Accord as a global product. The new
framework will be available for implementation in member jurisdictions as of
year-end 2006. The most advanced approaches to risk measurement will be
available for the year-end 2007.
Now that banks the world over are aligning their internal practices and
behaviour to the New Accord, it is advisable to discuss the implications of the
implementation of the New Accord for the Nigerian banking system. The aim
of this paper, therefore, is to review the original and new risk-based capital
standards (Basel I & ll Accords) and the criticisms that characterized both
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rules. It shall also outline the likely implications of the new rule for the
Nigerian banking system.
Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: section two following the
introduction discusses the role of capital and capital requirements in banks;
section three reviews the Basel I and II Accords; section four reviews the
criticisms of both rules; section five outlines the likely implications of the New
Accord for the Nigerian banking system; and section six concludes the paper
with some remarks.
II.

The Role of Capital and Capital Requirement in Banks

There is a consensus in the banking literature that the function of owners'
capital in bank is to reduce bank risk (Berger et al, 1995), (Altman and
Saunders, 1995), (Rose, 1996), (Koch and Macdonald, 2000), (Adewumi,
1997), (Peeks and Rosengreen, 1995). It does so in so many ways. First, it
provides a cushion to absorb bank losses. Owners' capital absorbs losses from
bad loans, poor securities investment, and crime and management
misjudgement so that the bank keeps operating until its problems are corrected
or its losses are recovered. It is only when the bank's losses are so large that
they overwhelm not only all other defences but also owners' capital will the
institution be forced to close its doors. Thus, owners' capital is the bank's last
line of defence against failure. Second, bank equity capital provides ready
access to financial markets by promoting public confidence in a bank and
reassuring its creditors and depositors of the bank's financial strength. The
level and adequacy of a bank's capital are factors “an educated depositor”
would consider in deciding which bank to put his money. Ordinarily, it will be
difficult for a bank with 1 million equity capital to attract a bank deposit of
8 million (Adewumi, 1997). Third, equity capital serves as a regulator of a
bank's growth. Peek and Rosengreen (1995) found that hundreds of smaller
banks with weak capital base disappeared through mergers because of
burgeoning growth in large business loans, which could only be made by
bigger banks with stronger capital base. Also, according to the Nigerian
banking laws, the maximum loan that can be made to a single borrower must
not be more than 20% of shareholders' funds unimpaired by losses. Banks
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whose shareholders' funds fail to grow fast enough find themselves loosing
market share in the competition for the largest borrowing customers. In
addition, banks that fail to maintain the prescribed minimum capital ratios are
prohibited from advertising for or accepting new deposits, granting credit,
making investment and paying cash dividend to shareholders.
Literature that relate to the role of capital adequacy requirements on bank
behaviour include Blum (1999), Chuiri et al (2002), Altman et al (2002),
Berger and Udeli (1991), Altman and Saunders (2001). Chiuri et al (2002)
found in their study that the enforcement of capital requirement has a negative
effect on the supply of bank loans in emerging countries. To meet minimum
capital requirements, banks studied cut back lending when it was too costly to
raise new capital. They, therefore, suggested caution in the process of raising
minimum capital requirements in emerging economies, where external
financing from non-bank financial institutions is generally weak. They
recommended adequate phased-in procedures to be considered by emerging
economies planning to introduce new and higher capital requirements.
Using a simple budget or accounting constraint models based on earlier work
of Peek and Rosengreen (1995), Altman et al (2002) showed another instance
where increasing capital requirements induced banks to cut back on their
loans. A comprehensive paper by the Bank Committee on Banking
Supervision (1999) survey on the response of banks in the G10 countries to the
enforcement of the 1988 capital adequacy requirements confirmed the
evidence that bank capital pressures could limit bank lending.
Regulators, concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of banks and
the stability of the financial system, prefer more equity capital in banks. This
reduces the likelihood of failure and frequency of supervision as well as
increases bank liquidity. Bankers on the other hand, generally prefer to operate
with less capital. The smaller is a bank equity base, the greater is financial
leverage and equity multiplier. High leverage converts normal return on assets
into a high return on equity (ROE). This conflict in interest between banks and
regulators makes it possible for banks to exploit any available loophole in
capital requirements rules to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
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The technical challenge for both banks and regulators has been how to
determine capital adequacy requirements. Increasing equity beyond market
requirement reduces the value of the bank, increases its weighted average cost
of finance, and imposes social costs. Capital requirements must be consistent
with the economic intent of the requirements. Thus, capital regulation involves
a trade-off between the marginal social benefit of reducing risk of the negative
externality from bank failures and the marginal social cost of diminishing
intermediation (Berger et al, 1991).
Ideal regulatory capital requirements would equate the marginal social cost of
higher capital with the marginal social benefit for each bank for each period.
For example, a bank that poses no significance externalities would be assigned
a relatively low capital requirement, while a bank that is likely to transmit
shocks to other banks would be subjected to high capital requirement. The
requirement would be continuously updated with changes in the risk position
of each bank. However, implementation of such an ideal framework would be
very expensive. Regulators lack precise estimates of social costs and benefits
to make capital requirement suitable for each bank and cannot easily revise the
requirements continuously as conditions change.
In practice capital regulation stipulates uniform, minimum ratios below which
banks are subject to regulatory sanctions. This minimum remains relatively
stable over time and compliance is monitored by on-site examinations and
routine inspection of banks' reports.
III.

Review of Basel I & II Accords

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a group of central banks and
bank supervisory authorities in 12 industrial countries developed and
presented the Basel I Accord in July 1988. The Accord was originally intended
for internationally active banks in G10 countries, but more than 100 countries
have adopted variant form of the Accord.
The 1988 Accord relates bank capital adequacy requirement to credit risk
exposure reflecting the perception that credit risk poses the most serious threat
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to bank solvency. Other types of risks were to be incorporated later. For
instance, the Committee amended the 1988 Accord to take account of capital
requirements for market risks in 1996. This amendment was modified in
September 1997 and November 2005. It adopted two alternative approaches to
the measurement of market risk: a standardized method and internal models
approach.
The 1988 Accord or Basel I
There are two components of the 1988 Accord. These include:
1.

The measurement of qualifying capital, the numerator and

2.

The determination of risk-weighted assets, the denominator.

Qualifying Capital
Under the Accord, qualifying regulatory capital is categorized into tier 1 and
tier 2 capitals. The tier 1 or core capital comprises common stock, retained
earnings, surplus, non-cumulative preferred stock, minority interest in equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries and selected identifiable intangible
assets. Tier 2 or supplementary capital includes qualifying subordinated debt,
cumulative preferred stock, capital certificates, and loan loss reserves in an
amount not to exceed 25% of risk-weighted assets, non-withdrawal accounts
and pledged deposits not included in core capital. Supplementary capital items
are considered less stable protection against losses. The total capital of a bank
could be derived from the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capitals. Some assets are
deducted from capital. These include goodwill, other intangible assets that do
not meet qualitative test, investment in subsidiaries that are not consolidated
and some reciprocal holdings of capital requirements of banking
organizations. Goodwill is deducted directly from core capital, while other
deductions are from total capital.
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Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA)
The denominator of the risk-based Basel I Accord measures banks' credit risk
exposure. Calculation of risk-weighted asset (RWA) is accomplished by
multiplying each asset item on a bank's balance sheet and any off-balance sheet
commitment by risk weighting factor designed to reflect the credit risk
exposure and summing the weighted categories to create risk weighted assets.
For on-balance sheet items, 0 percent risk weight is assigned to the following
asset category: cash, deposit at the Central Bank of Nigeria, treasury bills,
notes and bonds issued by government of the world leading industrial
countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and well-secured claims backed by cash, or deposits, or
by OECD central governments. 20 percent risk weight is assigned to the
following asset category: cash items in the process of collection, inter-bank
deposits, general obligation bond and notes issued by States and Local
governments and securities issued or backed by Federal government agencies.
50 percent risk weight is assigned to moderate risk assets such as residential
mortgages, loan on one-to-four family dwellings, selected multi familyhousing loans that are well secured and adequately performing and reserve
bonds issued by state and local government units or agencies. 100 percent risk
weight is assigned to highest risk assets such as commercial and industrial
loans, credit cards loans, real property assets, investment in bank subsidiary
company and all other bank assets not listed above.
For off-balance sheet items, the notional value of off-balance sheet items are
first converted to on-balance sheet “credit equivalent” amounts. The credit
equivalent amounts are then assigned risk weight applicable to the counter
party or underlying collateral.
Under the risk-based Basel I Accord, a bank should hold tier 1 capital at least
equal to 4% of risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 plus tier 2 capital should be at least
equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets. A tier 2 capital is limited to no more than
tier 1 capital. There is an additional supervising leverage requirement that
institutions with the highest examination ratings that meet certain other
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conditions must hold tier 1 capital at least equal to 3% of unweighted assets.
The formula for calculating capital adequacy ratio under the BIS I is Capital
Adequacy Ratio:
=

Total tier 1+ Tier 2 Capital
Total Risk Weighted Assets


……………….. (1)

The New Accord or Revised Framework or Basel II
Due to the limitations of the 1988 Accord, which are highlighted in the next
section, there has been broad-based pressure to radically review this Accord.
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision presented the final document
of the new proposal for establishing minimum capital requirement for banking
organizations in June 2004, with some amendments in November 2005. The
document is titled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework”. The New Accord represents the
outcome of the Committee's extensive consultations with bank supervisory
authorities' worldwide to secure international convergence on revision to
regulations governing capital adequacy of internationally active banks. The
Committee presented the first round of the proposal in June 1999 and
subsequently released additional proposals for consultation in January 2001
and April 2003. It also conducted three quantitative impact studies related to its
proposals. The New Framework and the standard it contains have been
endorsed by the Central Bank Governors and Head of Banking Supervision of
the G10 countries.
The Basel II retains the key elements of the 1988 capital adequacy framework
including the general requirement for banks to hold eligible capital equivalent
to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. It also retains the definition of
qualifying or eligible capital and the basic structure of the 1996 treatment of
market risk.
The Basel II Framework is packaged in the form of three mutually reinforcing
pillars. The first pillar represents a significant strengthening of the minimum
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requirements set out in the 1988 Accord, while the second and third pillars
represent innovative additions to capital supervision and market discipline.
Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements
For providing capital charge for credit risk, two principal options have been
proposed. There is the standardized approach and the internal rating based
(IRB) approach. The standardized approach is conceptually the same as that
found in the 1988 Accord, but is more risk sensitive. Under this approach, the
bank allocates a risk-weight to each of its assets and off-balance sheet positions
and produces a sum of risk-weighted asset values. A risk weight of 100%
means that an exposure is included in the calculation of risk weighted assets at
its full value, which translates into a capital charge equal to 8% of that value.
Similarly, a risk weight of 150% results in a capital charge of 12% ( i.e. 150%
of 8%) and a risk weight of 20% produces a capital charge of 1.6% ( i.e. 20% of
8%). The risk weights would be based on the rating from eligible external
credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) of borrowers (see Table 1 in the
appendix for more detail). Table 1 in the appendix summaries the various
options allowed under the standardized approach for slotting exposure
according to ratings from eligible external rating agencies (BIS, 2001)
Banks that engage in more sophisticated risk - taking and that have developed
advanced risk measurement systems may, with the approval of their
supervisors select from one of two internal ratings based approach (IRB). The
goal of the IRB approach is to align more accurately capital requirements with
the intrinsic amount of credit risk to which a bank is exposed. The IRB
approach is built on the concept of estimating borrowers' probability of default
(PD) based on the historical default experience of the bank. Banks should also
measure how much loss they will suffer should a borrower default on an
exposure. This is the term Loss Given Default (LGD) and is expressed as a
percentage of the exposure. The amount to which the bank is exposed to the
borrower at the time of default is expressed as exposure at default (EAD).
Under the IRB approach, banks will be allowed to use their internal estimates
of borrowers' creditworthiness to assess credit risk in their portfolio, subject to
strict methodological and disclosure standards.
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The framework allows for two approaches to IRB, namely, the foundation and
advanced approach. In the foundation approach banks estimate the probability
of default (PD) associated with each borrower, and the supervisor will supply
other inputs. In the advanced approach, a bank with a sufficiently developed
internal capital allocations process will be allowed to supply its own data for
loss given default, maturity adjustment factor, and exposure at default (EAD).
Operational Risk
The new framework establishes an explicit capital charge for a bank's
exposures to operational risk. Three different approaches of increasing
sophistication have been proposed. These include basic indicator,
standardized, and internal measurement. The basic indicator approach utilizes
one indicator of operational risk for a bank's total activity. The standardized
approach specifies different indicators for different business lines, while the
internal measurement approach requires banks to utilize their internal loss data
in the estimation of required capital. Similar to the range of options provided
for assessing exposures to credit risk, banks will choose one of three
approaches for measuring their exposures to operational risk that they and their
supervisors agree reflects the quality and sophistication of their internal
controls.
Calculation of RWA for Corporate Exposures
In the foundation approach, corporate exposures will receive a risk weight
(RWc) that depends on PD and LGD (after recognizing any credit
enhancements from collateral, guarantees or credit derivatives). The average
maturity of all exposures will be assumed to be three years. A corporate
exposure's risk weight, RWC, would be calculated according to the following
formula:
RWC = (LGD/50) x BRWC (PD) or 12.5 x LGD, which ever is
smaller. ……….................................................................………… (2)
The PD & LGD are expressed as whole numbers rather than decimals. For
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examples, LGD of 100% will be written as 100. The BRW (PD) represents the
corporate benchmark risk weight associated with a given PD. The values for
benchmark risk weight for a hypothetical corporate exposure having LGD of
50% are represented in Table 3 in the appendix.
In the advanced approach, or where there is an explicit maturity dimension in
the foundation approach, for an exposure with effective maturity (m) different
from 3 years, an asset's maturity adjusted risk weight would be calculated by
scaling up or down the corporate benchmark risk weight for a hypothetical 3year loan having the same PD and LGD. Thus, a corporate exposure's risk
weight in the advanced approach, RWc, can be expressed by the following
formula:
RWc = (LGD/50) x BRWc (PD) x [1+b (PD) x M 3], or 12.5 x LGD,
which ever is smaller. …………………………......................……. (3)
In this expression, BRWc (PD) is the corporate benchmark risk weight
associated with PD and the term 1+b (PD) x (M-3) is a multiplicative scaling
factor, linear in M, where the maturity adjustment factor b(PD) is also a
function of PD.
Calculation of Benchmark Risk Weight (BRW)
On the basis of the pooled survey and model-based evidence, the following
continuous function formulated by Gordy (2001) was selected as providing a
reasonable representation of the relationship between a corporate borrower's
PD and the associated risk weight for a benchmark loan to that borrower
having a 3-year maturity and LGD equal to 50%.
BRWc (PD) = 976.5 x N (1.118 x G (PD) + 1.288) x (1+0.047 x
(1-PD)/PD0.44) ....................................................................................(4)
Where PD is in decimal, N (x) denotes the cumulative distribution function for
a standard normal random variable. G (z) denotes the inverse cumulative
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distribution function for standard normal variable.

The term N (1.118 x G (PD) + 1.288) represents the sum of expected and
unexpected losses associated with a hypothetical, infinitely granular
portfolio of one-year loan having an LGD of 100%.

The term (1+0.047 x (1- PD)/ PD0.44) is an adjustment to reflect that the
IRB benchmark risk weights are calibrated to a 3-year average maturity;

The scaling factor 976.5, which is calibrated so that IRB benchmark risk
weight equals 100% for values of PD and LGD equal to 0.7% and 5%,
respectively.
Calculation of RWR and BRWR for Retail Exposures
Retail exposures will receive a risk weight that depends on PD and LGD, after
recognizing any credit enhancement from collateral, guarantees or credit
derivatives. The risk weight for a retail exposure would not depend on the
maturity (M) of the exposure. The following formula would be used to
calculate risk weight to a retail exposure:
RWR = (LGD/50) x BRWR (PD) or 12.5 x LGD, which ever is
smaller. …………..................................................................…… .. (5)
The PD and LGD are whole numbers and not decimals. In this expression, RWR
represents the risk weight associated with given values of PD for retail
exposures, while BRWR denotes the benchmark risk weight associated with a
given PD, which is calibrated to an LGD of 50%.
The BRWR is assigned to each exposure reflecting the PD of the exposure
based on the following formula:
BRWR (PD)= 976.5 x N (1.043 x G (PD) + 0.766) +(1 + 0.047 x (1 - PD)/
0.44
PD ) ….......................................................................................…. (6)
Where N denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal
random variable and G represents the inverse cumulative distribution function
for a standard normal random variable (i.e. the value x such that N (x) = z)
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Table 4 shows the benchmark risk weight for retail exposure on the basis of a
given PD and calibrated to a 50% LGD.
Pillar II: Supervisory Review Process
More specifically, the supervisory review process under the new Accord is
based on the following principles:


To ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risk in their
business and to encourage banks to develop and use better risk
management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.



Banks' management are expected to develop an internal assessment
process and setting capital targets that are commensurate with the
bank's risk profile and control environment.



Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their
capital needs relative to their risks and to intervene were appropriate.



Supervisors are to ensure that each bank has sound internal control and
effective risk management process.

Pillar III: Market Discipline and Reporting
Pillar III encourages market discipline by developing a set of disclosure
requirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of
information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk
assessment processes and, hence, the capital adequacy of the institution. In
principle banks' disclosure should be consistent with how senior management
and board of directors assess and manage the risks of the bank.
The Basel II Framework sets out the details for adapting more risk-sensitive
minimum capital requirement for banking organizations. It reinforces this risksensitiveness requirement by setting out principles for banks to assess the
adequacy of their capital and for supervisors to review such assessments to
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ensure that banks have adequate capital to support their risks. It also seeks to
strengthen market discipline by enhancing transparency in banks' financial
reporting.
Another principal change in the new framework is the granting of greater
flexibility to banks to determine their appropriate level of equity capital that
can absorb expected losses.
IV. A Critique of the Basel I & II Accords
Basel I Accord
The Basel I Accord has been widely criticized by practitioners, academics,
regulators and supervisory authorities based on the following limitations.


Focus on a Single Risk Measure: One of the most glaring
shortcomings of the 1988 Accord on bank capital is its failure to
incorporate significant measure of banks' risk exposures. The risk
weights were designed primarily to take account of credit risk. But
banks also face significant market and operational risks. Market risk is
the losses a bank may suffer due to adverse change in interest rates,
security prices, currency, and commodity prices. While operational risk
is the losses incurred due to variation in operating expenses resulting
from breakdown in quality control, inefficiencies in producing and
delivering services, management misjudgement, etc.



Standardized Risk Weights Not Related To Actual Risk: Research
evidence shows that the standardized risk weights in the Accord do not
correspond well with actual risk. Avery and Berger (1991) found that
some of the weights on the asset categories are out of line with the future
performance results and that the explanatory power of the regression
was limited. Bradley et al (1991) found that the risk-weighted assets for
banks were positively related to the probability of failure and
accounting measure of risk, but the risk-weights in risk- weighted assets
were often out of alignment with actual risk. Cordell and King (1995)
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obtained similar results, but used an entirely different methodology.
They applied option-pricing methods to market data on publicly traded
banks and thrifts to measure their risks. They found numerous problems
with the relative risk weights for both banks and thrifts, and concluded
that accounting measures of capital may overstate the actual value of
capital that is available to absorb losses.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision when presenting an earlier
version of the new accord in 1999 said:
“The current risk-weighting of asset results, at best, is a crude measure
of economic risk, primarily because degrees of credit risk exposure are
not significantly calibrated as to adequately differentiate between
borrowers differing default risk” (BCBS, 1999).
These literature reviews provide enough evidence to corroborate the fact that
the standardized risk weights in the original Accord do not represent actual
measure of risk.


Broad-Brush Structure of Risk: The 1988 Accord has been criticized
for its broad-brush structure of risk categories, which does not give
consideration for credit quality. A better way to understand this
argument is to look at the categories of assets under corporate loans that
are assigned the same risk weights. Under the Accord, all commercial
and industrial loans are assigned risk weight of 100%. This means that a
triple A rated loan has the same risk weight with a triple C junk bond. A
bank would have to hold the same capital for these broad classes of
assets. The broad-brush nature of risk categories in the Accord gives
scope for a bank to arbitrage between economic assessment of risk and
the regulatory capital requirements (BIS, 1999; 21). If assets with
different risk- return characteristics have the same capital requirements,
banks favour those assets that offer a relatively high-expected rate of
return. They can engage in regulatory arbitrage and choose relatively
risky asset offering the highest expected return among those with
certain capital requirement (Benink and Wihlhorg, 2002).
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One Size Fit All: The 1988 Accord prescribes uniform capital
requirement for all banks irrespective of the level of advances they
reached in risk management techniques. Innovations in the market have
enabled banks from various countries to make use of sophisticated
financing techniques to effectively arbitrage between banks' risk and
minimum capital levels. One technique used is securitization.
Securitization can lead to a shift in banks portfolio concentration to
lower quality assets. According to the research carried out by the Bank
for International Settlements Working Party on Bank Capital and
Behaviour, the empirical evidence on the impact of the 1988 Accord
over a ten-year period revealed significant amount of securitization
related arbitrage undertaken by US, Canadian, European and Japanese
banks' (BIS, 2001).



No Consideration is Given to Tenor: Whether a facility is for one year
or ten years, the capital requirement is the same. This gives incentive for
banks to provide excessive short-term facilities. It also misrepresents
the risks banks take on with longer-term facilities.



Manipulation of RWA: Another potential problem with the original
Accord is that the risk-weighted asset (RWA) used as a denominator may
be subject to manipulation by bank management. Banks may be able to
restructure their transaction to reduce their capital requirements without
reducing their actual risk exposures. Merton (1995) provided an
example of how the current RWA can be circumvented by using a
portfolio of mortgages.

The Way Forward
Improvement on the imperfections of the 1988 Accord can be suggested in the
following areas:


To avoid regulatory arbitrage, risk-weighting system should be detailed
and based on the “true” or “best available” measure of risk of each
particular asset. Jones and King (1995) showed that risk weight in assets
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that are classified as substandard; doubtful or loss can improve RWA.
Thus, by giving more weight to classified assets, a modified RWA is
likely to be closer to the “true” measure of the credit risk.


Specifying risk categories with narrow limits can reduce the incentive
for banks to develop expertise in regulatory arbitrage. The BCBS own
survey on banks' practices in credit risk assessment (BCBS, 2002)
showed that banks' practices vary from highly intuitive placement of
credits into risk categories to the use of fairly sophisticated risk
assessment models.



Any proposal that incorporates the significant risks that banks face
outside credit risk may be an improvement on the Basel I Accord.



Any proposal that takes account of maturity factor of credit in
determining RWA may also be an improvement on the current Accord.

Critique of the Basel II Framework


A substantial challenge facing banks and supervisors of the internal
rating approach in the New Accord is to map an internal rating method
into risk-weights that are consistent across banks.



The potential for risk arbitrage existing under the current Accord may
remain to an extent under the IRB system in the New Accord as well.
Because risk weights are based on banks' private information rather
than on externally verifiable facts, supervisors may have difficulties in
verifying the truthfulness of banks' estimates. This may give room for
banks to use their private credit risk information to circumvent risk
weighting presented to the regulatory authorities.

One type of “gaining and manipulation” would occur if a bank uses its private
information to place relatively high- risk and high-return credit in a lower risk
category. The quantitative importance of gaining and manipulation has been
estimated by Carey and Hrycay (2000). They concluded that officially
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reported default rate for a given rating can be made as low as half the banks'
private estimates.
It may be suggested to impose penalties on banks that systematically and
deliberately understate risk. However, penalties system may lack credibility if
imposed on banks in distress.
Pillar II Proposals have been criticized as not having a very clear demarcation
line between the responsibilities of the banks themselves and those of the
regulators (Gabarretta, 2003)
V.

Implication of the New Accord for the Nigerian Banking System

Although the new framework's focus is primarily on international active
banks, its underlying principles are intended to be suitable for application to
banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication. The document
embodying the New Accord has being circulated to bank supervisory
authorities worldwide with a view to encouraging them to consider its
adoption at such time as they believe is consistent with their broader
supervisory priorities. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision,
therefore, expects the New Accord to be adhered to by all significant banks
after a period of time.
Therefore, although all the twenty-five consolidated banks in Nigeria as of
January 2006 might not be internationally active, at least a number of them
would surely possess those inherent characteristics that would qualify them as
significant banks. It is expected that the CBN, which adopted the 1988 Accord,
would also adopt the New Accord in the near future. It is, therefore, pertinent to
discuss the likely implications of the New Accord for the Nigerian banking
system.


Under the Pillar II of the New Accord, most of the burden of controlling
banks internal risk assessment is placed on expanded and active
supervision. This requires additional human resources in the
supervisory function. For Nigeria to adopt the new proposal, the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is expected to build up its expertise substantially
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in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
Basel II calls for banking organization to store substantial quantity of
data. To produce a measure of Risk-Weighted Assets, the BIS require
banks to store a comprehensive database of operational loss incidents,
financial instruments, credit losses, and general ledger data. Banks that
seek to calculate pillar 1 capital using the advanced IRB approach also
require seven years of default data.



The cost of setting up an appropriate Basel II complaint risk control
system is likely to be a formidable challenge for both banks and
regulators. It has been estimated that the implementation and
compliance cost - using a net present value basis over 5-years period
with 5% reference rate - of Basel II could possibly exceed US $ 1000
billion (Gabarette, 2003:69). This is equivalent to about one half of the
value of tier 1 capital held by banks worldwide. Since the concept of
internal rating system is still new to Nigerian banks, it is likely that the
adoption of the advanced IRB approach could require a huge cost
outlay. The issue of cost effectiveness in this regard cannot be ignored.
The benefit of adopting the IRB approach has to be balanced with the
cost.



The proposal precludes less developed banks from using the IRB
approach, which requires less capital. This has implications regarding
the competitive position of less and well developed banks.



The high-risk profile of Nigerian sovereign (external) debt resulting
from huge debt overhang implies low ratings from external rating
agencies. This could result in higher cost of credit for the public sector
as a direct consequence of both standardized and IRB approaches.



Notwithstanding that the incentive to move to more advanced
approaches is inherent in the structure of the New Accord; one can
safely say that the standardized approach will be used by most banks in
Nigeria for some years before they could reach the level of
sophistication in risk management envisaged by the New Accord. The
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standardized approach relies on ratings from external credit rating
agencies. In Nigeria there are only 3 known credit rating agencies
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They
include Agusto & Co. Ltd, CMC International and West African Rating
and Pharez. However, out of these three, only the first two are readily
accessible and produce solicited and unsolicited credit assessment of
businesses. Their coverage is still low for meaningful implementation
of the new proposal. This implies that more credit rating agencies have
to be established to specialize in assessing local companies and banks.
Again, the new Accord provides national supervisors the possibility of
determining whether external credit assessment institution (ECAI) meets a
number of eligibility criteria in order for it's rating to be used for capital
purposes. These criteria include objectivity, independence, transparency,
information disclosure, sufficient resources and credibility on the part of the
ECAI. So the issue is not just to establish ECAI, but also to establish ECAI that
will pass the eligibility criteria.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The critique attempted in this paper is based on the form of the rules in Basel I
& II Capital Accords, and not on the substance of establishing capital adequacy
rules based on risk sensitivity.
Capital adequacy must be measured in relation to factors that significantly
affect banking organizations. Banks are mostly affected by the risk they
assume. They are affected by the risk that credit extended to customers will
decline in value and perhaps become worthless as a result of default (credit
risk). They are mostly affected by the volatility in interest rates, security prices,
foreign exchange rates and commodity prices (market risk). They are also
affected by the fact that operating expenses might vary significantly from what
is expected (operational risk). These risks reduce the value of banks' assets
over time.
Principally customers' deposits, owners' capital and creditors finance bank's
assets. Regulators, particularly concerned with the interest of depositors,
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advocate that owners' capital should be adequate enough to absorb the gradual
depreciation in asset value resulting from risk exposure. Therefore, it is proper
and sensible to base rules on capital adequacy requirements on risk sensitivity.
Absolute rules on minimum paid-up capital or shareholders' funds are only
useful to the extent that they serve as supplementary or temporary measure to
address the potential uncertainties in the accuracy of measure of risk exposure.
Basel II is flexible enough to allow national supervisory authorities the
freedom to adopt supplementary measure of capital adequacy for banking
organizations in their jurisdictions. The absolute rules on minimum paid-up
capital or shareholders' funds in Nigeria should therefore serve as supplement
to the risk-based capital standards of Basel II. However, its imposition should
not be too abrupt and too high to induce disruptive panic in the banking system.
Banks should be given enough time to comply through adequate phased-in
program.
The CBN should recognize the relationship that exists between the amount of
capital held by the bank against its risk and the strength and effectiveness of the
bank's risk management and internal control process. Increased capital should
not be viewed as the only option for addressing increased risks confronting the
bank. Other means for addressing risk such as strengthening the level of
provision and reserves and improving internal controls must also be
considered. Overall, capital should not be regarded as substitute for addressing
fundamentally inadequate control or risk management process.
Moving towards the adoption of Basel II in the near future may not be a first
priority for Nigeria in terms of what is needed to strengthen its supervision.
The CBN should consider carefully the cost implications of the New Accord
for the banking system before developing timetable for its implementation.
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Appendix
Table 1: The Standardized Approach Using Standard & Poor's Methodology
Assessment

Claim
AAA
to AA-

A+
to A-

BBB+
To BBB-

BB+
to B-

Below
B-

Unrated

Sovereign

0%
(1)

20%
(2)

50%
(3)

100%
(4-6)

150%
(7)

100%
(8)

Banks : Option 1a
Option 2b

20%
20%
(20%) c

50%
50%
(50%)

100%
50%
(20%)

100%
100%
(50%)

150%
150%
(150%)

100%
50%
(20%)

BB+
to BB-

Below
BB-

Unrated

100%

150%

100%

Corporate

20%

50%

100%

Retail Mortgages
Other retail
a.
b.
c.

40%
75%

Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incor porated, but one category less
favourable.
Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank.
Claims on banks of a short original maturity, less than three months, would generally receive a weighting that
is one category more favourable than the usual risk weight on the bank’s claim.

Sources: BIS (2001)

Table 2: Capital Requirements (%) as Rating Fall
Rating

PD

Current

Standardized

Capital

Approach

IRB
Foundation

AAAa

0.03

8

1.6

1.13

AA

0.03

8

1.6

1.13

A

0.03

8

4.0

1.13

BBB

0.2

8

8.0

3.61

BB

1.4

8

8.0

12.35

B

6.6

8

12.0

30.96

CCC

15.0

8

12.0

47.04
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Table 3: BRWC Associated with Representative PD Values
PD (%)

BRWC

0.03

14

0.05

19

0.1

29

0.2

45

0.4

70

0.5

81

0.7

100

1

125

2

192

3

246

5

331

10

482

15

588

20

625

Source: BIS (2001)

Table 4: BRWR Associated with Representative PD Values
PD(%)

BRWR

0.03

6

0.05

9

0.10

14

0.2

21

0.4

34

0.5

40

0.7

50

1

64

2

104

3

137

5

195

10

310

15

401

20

479

30

605

Source: BIS (2001)

